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Personal Proceedings Act 2002, s 32 – duty to disclose – consequences of non-disclosure – 
discretion to excuse non-compliance 
In Newson v Aust Scan Pty Ltd t/a Ikea Springwood [2010] QSC 223 the Supreme Court examined the 
discretion under s 32(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (“PIPA”), to permit a 
document which has not been disclosed as required by the pre-court procedures under the PIPA to 
be used in a subsequent court proceeding. This appears to be the first time that the nature and 
parameters of the discretion have been judicially considered. 
Facts 
The plaintiff suffered serious injuries when crushed between a truck and a loading dock at the first 
defendant’s business premises on 15 July 2004. The parties undertook all the pre-court procedures 
required by the PIPA, but the first defendant failed to disclose during that process a document which 
was said to constitute the first defendant’s policy ensuring a safe system of work for persons like the 
plaintiff. The existence of this document was first revealed when the first defendant referred to it in 
its defence, delivered in August 2009. 
The plaintiff sought to restrain the first defendant from using the document at all in the proceedings. 
He also sought orders that certain nominated paragraphs of the first defendant’s defence be struck 
out, on the basis that they involved a “use” of the offending document. The first defendant applied 
for an order that its admitted non-disclosure of the document be excused.  
Legislation 
Section 32 of the PIPA provides: 
32  Consequences of failure to give information 
(1) This section applies if a party fails to comply with a provision of division 1 or this division 
requiring the party to disclose a document to another party. 
(2) The document can not be used by the party in a subsequent court proceeding based on the 
claim, or the deciding of the claim, unless the court orders otherwise. 
(3) If the document comes to the other party’s knowledge, the document may be used by the 
other party. 
 
Analysis  
 
Alan Wilson J (“Wilson J”) found it to be plain that the phrase “unless the court orders otherwise” 
gave the court a discretion to override the prohibition in the subsection. His Honour accepted that 
the statutory conferral of a discretionary power is, ordinarily, to be construed liberally. Further, the 
exercise of the power is not subject to unnecessary limitations that do not appear in the words of 
the statutory grant: Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 191 (per Mason CJ and 
Deane J) and 205 per Gaudron J).   His Honour noted, however, the remarks of Kirby and Callinan JJ 
in Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478 at 503 that the discretion must be exercised in 
accordance with the language of the statute by which it is conferred and to achieve the purpose for 
which the power is granted. 
 
The judgment includes a discussion of two Queensland decisions in which the court exercised its 
discretion to excuse the non-compliance with the PIPA or the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld) (“UCPR”): Luck v Lusty EMS Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 146; Vicary v State of Queensland [2009] QSC 
284. 
 
Reference was also made to several cases involving legislation dealing with claims for damages for 
personal injury. In these cases, the consequences of non-compliance with provisions requiring pre-
action steps, occasioned through error (or even negligence or incompetence) of a party’s solicitor, 
were not visited upon the client. One specific instance provided was the failure to give a notice in a 
timely fashion under s 37 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld). Wilson J stated that this 
legislation contemplates that the defaulting party has the opportunity to provide “a reasonable 
excuse for the delay.” His Honour noted the Court of Appeal has said in this context that a claimant 
who entrusts a lawyer with the carriage of the claim, and is reasonably diligent in giving the 
necessary instructions, should not be penalised if the lawyer does not act to comply with the 
legislation: Perdis v The Nominal Defendant [2003] QCA 555 at [12], [13] per Davies JA. 
 
The provisions of this nature were then contrasted with the terms of s 32 of the PIPA (at [17]-[18]): 
Parliament did not similarly expand the parameters of the discretion here. It is plain that 
complete disclosure of all relevant documents is at the heart of the PIPA process. Deliberate 
withholding is an offence, and non-compliance without reasonable excuse constitutes 
unprofessional conduct. On any view, the legislature has placed a strong emphasis upon the 
obligation to disclose. 
 
The judge accepted that there may be instances of non-compliance which were not due to a lack of 
diligence on the lawyer’s part, and such instances may be capable of attracting the exercise of the 
discretion.  In this instance the document in dispute came into the solicitor’s possession after the 
initial round of disclosure under s 27 of the PIPA, however it was provided to her on 9 October 2007. 
The document was not disclosed at the compulsory conference that took place on 5 June 2009, or at 
all, until a copy was sought by the plaintiff’s lawyers after they saw the reference to it in the first 
defendant’s defence. There was no suggestion the plaintiff, or the other defendants, contributed in 
any way to the non-compliance. 
 
Wilson J did not anticipate that any serious prejudice was likely to be suffered by the plaintiff if the 
first defendant were allowed to rely upon the document, but he emphasised that the consequences 
of a favourable exercise of the discretion must be considered in light of the importance the 
legislation places upon proper compliance. His Honour acknowledged the traditional emphasis, in 
our system of justice, upon a trial which fully enables all parties to ventilate the real issues between 
them, but he found nothing in s 32 to suggest that the legislature did not take this into account. He 
said the wording of the provision indicated “a deliberate choice...to visit serious, even draconian, 
consequences upon the defaulting party.” To excuse the first defendant in this case would be to set 
the bar quite low, a conclusion his Honour found would not sit comfortably with the simple words 
used in the provision. 
 
The first defendant’s application was refused. Nominated paragraphs in the first defendant’s 
defence were held to involve a “use” of the offending document and were struck out, though the 
first defendant was given the opportunity to re-plead in accordance with the decision. 
 
Comment 
 
The legislation considered in this case is analogous to r 225 of the UCPR, which relates to the 
consequences of non-compliance with the obligation to disclose under those rules. One of those 
consequences is the prohibition on the party in default tendering the document, or adducing 
evidence of its contents, without the court’s leave: r 225(1)(a). Although there has been limited 
judicial consideration of this rule, it has also been emphasised in the context of an examination of 
this discretion that the duty to disclose is fundamental to the conduct of modern disclosure and that 
the efficient conduct of litigation requires that parties should “lay their cards on the table”: 
Dougmax Pty Ltd v Hodges [2003] QDC 214. 
 
As Wilson J commented in the course of his judgment, the exercise of the discretion to excuse non-
compliance might ordinarily be expected to involve some focus upon the conduct of the defaulting 
party. Practitioners must have a system or procedures in place for ensuring, so far as possible, 
compliance with the requirements of the legislative provisions. Should a breach nevertheless result, 
it might then be possible to demonstrate a reason for the court to exercise its discretion to relieve a 
party from the serious consequences which might otherwise be expected to result. 
 
